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1. Introduction 
With growing trade volumes, marine shipping has become a major source of carbon emissions. 
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from shipping reached 972 million tons in 2012, accounting for about 2.5% of the global emissions 
volume (Third IMO GHG Study, 2014). Other harmful emissions from international shipping, such as 
NO2 and SO2, have increased to 13% and 12% of global emission levels, respectively. Recently, there 
is growing interest in mitigating emissions from the maritime sector. Although some progresses have 
been made on setting international standards for ship's energy efficiency, such as the Energy Efficiency 
Design Index (EEDI) and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), attempts to 
implement more emission abatement policies globally have encountered a lot of challenges despite the 
urgent needs to do so (Lister et al., 2015).  
 
Governments and regulators have resorted, therefore, to regional or unilateral regulations such as 
emission control areas (ECAs) and regional speed limits (Chang and Wang, 2012; Panagakos et al., 
2014; Sys et al., 2016). The Port of Long Beach, for instance, established a reduced speed zone (RSZ) 
in 2006 that requires vessels to slow down when they are within 20 nautical miles (nm) of the port. This 
zone was extended to 40 nm in 2010. ECAs were first introduced in the Baltic Sea and North Sea in 
Europe. In September 2015, China’s Ministry of Transport released the Ship and Port Pollution 
Prevention Special Action Plan (2015-2020), aiming to reduce sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions by 
up to 65% in its major port areas. To this end, the central government has designated the Pearl River 
Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and Bohai-rim Waters as domestic ECAs (see Fig. 1), within which it will 
be compulsory for ships to burn fuel with a sulfur content of less than 0.5% from January 1, 2019. The 
local governments in the Yangtze River Delta took action ahead of the schedule. Starting from April 1, 
2016, ships are required to switch from regular heavy fuel oil (HFO) to low-sulfur marine gas oil (MGO) 
with a sulfur content of less than 0.5% when berthing at the four “key ports” identified in the Yangtze 
River Delta area, i.e., the ports of Shanghai, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Suzhou, and Nantong. This regulation 
will gradually cover the whole Yangtze River Delta ECAs over the next three years, with tightened caps 
on sulfur content. Because bunker costs usually account for 50 or even 60% of the total operating cost 
of a shipping company (Notteboom, 2006; Golias et al., 2009), switching from regular HFO to 
expensive MGO leads to a significant increase in shipping costs, which could harm both shipping 
companies and shippers. Therefore, the unilateral sulfur emission regulation imposed by the Chinese 
government is likely to change the marine transport competition outcome between the Port of Shanghai 
and the Port of Busan (see Fig. 1). The two ports are major competitors in East Asia especially for 
intercontinental transshipment cargoes from northern China to Europe and North America (Anderson 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, as the ECAs for the Pearl River Delta and Bohai-rim Waters have not yet 
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been implemented, the cargo flow distribution may also be reshaped following the Yangtze River Delta 
ECA initiative.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Geographical locations of the newly proposed ECAs in China 
In addition to these unilateral administrative measures adopted in different regions, proposals have been 
made to introduce some market-based measures. Regulators and international organizations have made 
tremendous efforts to promote plans such as the maritime Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and carbon 
tax (Lee et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013; Franc and Sutto, 2014; Koesler et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015). 
These market-based measures have been seriously considered by every Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MPEC) since MPEC 56 in July 2006. However, rather limited progress has been made in 
implementing these schemes on a global scale. Indeed, the European Commission once planned to 
include the aviation sector in the European Union ETS (EU-ETS) from 2012.1 The decision, however, 
encountered strong opposition from other countries and was reduced to covering operations within the 
European Economic Area only. Nevertheless, the transport industry is concerned that such a regional 
ETS could induce some “side-effects,” including possible airline network reconfigurations. For 
example, a direct flight between Singapore and Frankfurt is fully subject to the EU-ETS, whereas with 
a two-leg flight via Zurich, only the leg between Zurich and Frankfurt is included (Albers et al., 2009). 
This may induce airlines to switch to inefficient hub routings. Similar concerns may also occur in the 
maritime sector if a maritime ETS is unilaterally imposed in certain regions (Franc and Sutto, 2014). 
 
Whether a regional administrative measure or a unilateral market-based instrument is imposed, it would 
                                                              
1 The proposed EU-ETS requires that all flights (regardless of carrier nationality) should acquire allowances to cover their CO2 
emissions before operating from/to an airport within the EU-ETS countries (Malina et al., 2012). 
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become a cost component for the carriers equivalent to an increase in effective average fuel prices 
(Brueckner and Zhang, 2010; Wang et al., 2015). This is due to the fact that emission amount is directly 
proportional to fuel consumption.2 Therefore, if unilateral emission regulations (e.g., RSZs, ECAs, 
carbon tax, or ETS) are to be implemented in certain regions only, the average effective bunker fuel 
prices will vary between alternative shipping routes. In such a case, shippers can either stick to the 
shorter shipping routes with higher effective fuel prices or switch to alternative routes that are exempt 
from emission regulations such as carbon tax, ETS, or RSZs/ECAs (e.g., recall the situation between 
the Port of Shanghai and Port of Busan). The majority of studies only investigate the optimal operational 
strategy of shipping companies on specific routes if a certain emission regulation is introduced, 
especially on the trade-off between slow steaming and increased fleet size (i.e., the trade-off between 
fuel cost and capital cost). Although these studies offer rich insights into the effects of emission 
regulations on shipping companies’ operations, they rarely consider the resultant competition between 
regional ports and between shipping companies, and how shipping companies and port authorities 
would respond to unilateral regulations implemented in specific regions. As a result, the overall effects 
of such regulations on the maritime industry remain unclear. There is a need to explicitly  consider 
shipping company and port competition in the evaluation of emission policies.  
 
On the other hand, although the IMO has succeeded in promoting certain uniformly adopted 
environmental regulations in the maritime sector (such as the EEDI and the SEEMP), some countries 
and/or regions are not satisfied with the IMO's slow progress and have been introducing  unilateral 
regulations. Koji Sekimizu, the former Secretary General of the IMO, emphasized at the 2015 
International Chamber of Shipping conference in London that “Shipping is international and global, not 
national and not regional… no state should seek, unilaterally, to impose national, or regional, 
requirements or standards”.3 It is obvious that there exists quite a discrepancy between the IMO and 
some governments with regard to the best approach to introduce emission regulation. Intuitively, a 
uniform policy adopted globally should be superior to unilateral regulations implemented in different 
regions. On the other hand, if the differences are marginal, it may be practical to also consider unilateral 
regulations in certain circumstances. Economic and trade developments promote the growth of the 
maritime sector, whereas the performance of the maritime sector significantly influences economic and 
trade patterns, environmental issues and social welfare (Chang et al., 2007, 2010; Lee et al., 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013; Lam, 2015). With such large stakes, it is important to fully compare the economic and 
environmental effects of these emission regulations before introducing any of them to the maritime 
sector.  
                                                              
2 For a detailed explanation, see Page 963 in Brueckner and Zhang (2010). 
3 Lloyd’s List, http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/regulation/article468397.ece. 
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This study aims to contribute to this important policy debate by developing an integrated model to 
compare the overall economic and environmental effects of a unilateral emission regulation vis-à-vis a 
uniform regulation under shipping company and port competition. Following Brueckner and Zhang 
(2010) and Wang et al. (2015), the emission regulations considered in this study are not restricted to 
any particular form (e.g., ECAs, ETS, or carbon tax), but are modeled as an asymmetric increase or a 
symmetric increase of average effective price of fuel under uniform regulations and unilateral 
regulations, respectively. . Such a treatment allows us to capture the fundamental characteristics of 
alternative regulations in a general framework. We first model the competition equilibrium in a maritime 
shipping market with two ports, each served by a shipping company. The behaviors of shipping 
companies and ports are modeled in a two-stage game, so that market equilibria under alternative 
regulations can be solved and compared. In the first stage, the two ports set their own service charges. 
In the second stage, the shipping companies compete with each other by choosing their own freight 
rates and vessel speeds. Both shipping companies and ports are profit-maximizing decision-makers. 
Subsequently, the economic (in terms of profit, cargo volumes etc.) and environmental (in terms of total 
emissions) effects of unilateral and uniform emission regulations are compared. The analytical results 
are finally illustrated in a numerical study with two hypothetical competing routes.  
 
This paper aims to contribute to both academic literature and industrial practices. First, the proposed 
two-stage game explicitly considers the competition of regional ports and shipping companies in the 
presence of emission regulations. It also captures operational considerations, such as the inventory costs 
of in-transit cargo, and the tradeoff between increased fleet size and slow steaming. Compared with the 
qualitative studies and the general equilibrium models proposed in the literature, such an approach 
allows us to incorporate important operational details in a general analytical framework that models the 
effects of alternative policies and market dynamics. Second, the findings indicate that a unilateral 
regulation may actually lead to an increase in total emissions, whereas a uniform regulation always 
reduces total emissions. Either type of regulation may result in asymmetric effects on shipping 
companies and ports. A unilateral emission regulation harms the affected ports and shipping companies 
in terms of lower cargo volume and profits, and benefits the ports and shipping companies not subject 
to such regulation. Similarly, a uniform emission regulation favors those ports and shipping companies 
with a shorter sailing distance at the expense of the ports and shipping companies on longer routes. 
Therefore, regulators and the maritime industry need to strike a balance between emission reduction 
and fair competition. Our study cautions against unilateral regulations, and emphasizes the importance 
to take into account the effects of alternative policies on the operations of shipping companies and ports.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief summary of the 
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related literature and highlights the contributions of this study. Section 3 formulates a two-stage game 
to characterize the decisions of shipping companies and port authorities when transport demand is fixed 
(inelastic). Market equilibria are analytically solved and benchmarked under a unilateral regulation 
versus a uniform regulation. Section 4 provides a numerical study of the two-stage game for the case of 
elastic demand. Section 5 concludes the paper and identifies areas for future studies. 
2. Literature review 
Various regulations have been proposed in the maritime industry for the control of emissions, ranging 
from mandatory operational requirements to industry standards and market-based instruments (Miola 
et al., 2011; Lam and Notteboom, 2012). In the climate policy literature, many technical reports and 
studies were devoted to addressing the design issues and/or the legal implications (territorial 
jurisprudence) of various uniform or unilateral emission regulations (see, for example, CE Delft, 2009; 
IMO, 2010a; Kremlis, 2010; Ringbom, 2011; Koesler et al., 2015; Hermeling et al., 2015). There were 
also some relevant studies in the transnational environmental regulation literature (see Lister et al., 2015 
and the references therein). Quite a few researchers analyzed the economic and environmental effects 
of unilateral regulations in the aviation transport sector (see, for example, Albers et al., 2009; 
Scheelhaase et al., 2010; Yuen and Zhang, 2011; Vespermann and Wald, 2011; Malina et al., 2012). For 
the maritime transport sector, Lee et al. (2013) analyzed the effects of a maritime carbon tax on 
individual countries’ container trade volumes and real GDP levels. Compared with a uniform carbon 
tax implemented globally, European countries would suffer more economic losses if such a tax was 
only adopted across the EU. Franc and Sutto (2014) investigated the economic consequences of 
different maritime ETS schemes (in terms of geographic scope and degree of connection to other carbon 
trading markets) on the re-organization of shipping network and services to ports. Hermeling et al. 
(2015) explored the economic and legal implications of an EU maritime ETS imposed over three 
possible geographical areas, namely the European territorial waters, the European economic zones plus 
European territorial waters, and the whole route. They concluded that the whole route regulation was 
economically optimal but would violate world trade laws.  
 
Previous studies have frequently used computable general equilibrium models to identify the overall 
effects of alternative regulations for different economies. These models, however, often ignored the 
competition dynamics of shipping companies and ports. In contrast, Wang et al. (2015) examined the 
effects of two alternative ETS schemes: an open ETS under which the maritime sector could trade 
emission permits with other sectors; and a closed, maritime-only ETS, under which shipping companies 
could only trade permits with each other. Their study was based on partial equilibrium analysis. The 
results suggest that it is very important to consider the competition dynamics in the maritime sector; 
otherwise, biased conclusions may be obtained. The authors cautioned a simple generalization of their 
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conclusions to the cases of regional ETS schemes, because their model did not consider operational 
details such as shipping network reconfiguration and route choices. 
 
In terms of operational-level analyses, quite a few studies have investigated the effects of emission 
regulations on shipping operations, with a particular focus on the selection of vessel speed and fleet size 
on a route-specific basis. Cariou and Cheaitou (2012) compared the effects of a regional speed limit 
zone versus an international fuel tax on shipping operations and the resultant CO2 emissions. Using two 
independent transatlantic liner services as examples, their numerical studies suggested that a regional 
speed limit was inferior to a bunker levy in terms of total CO2 emissions and abatement cost. Using a 
case study of the Port of Kaohsiung, Chang and Wang (2012) compared the effectiveness of a reduced 
speed zone, ECA, and alternative power schemes in reducing fuel consumption and emissions. The 
calculations were based on simple simulations of the current shipping operations. Doundnikoff and 
Lacoste (2014) examined whether the sulfur emission control area (SECA) would induce shipping 
companies to differentiate their vessel speeds inside and outside of the SECA. They applied a cost 
minimization model to four liner service cases, all of which suggested that total CO2 emissions would 
increase because shipping speeds outside the SECA would rise to compensate for the extra time and 
slow speed inside the SECA. Fagerholt and Psaraftis (2015) proposed two vessel-speed optimization 
models to address ships sailing in and out of ECAs. In both cases, the objective was to maximize daily 
profit. Given the importance of ECAs, a special issue in Transportation Research Part D (Cullinane and 
Bergqvist, 2014) has published several relevant papers investigating ECAs and their effects on maritime 
transport. 
 
These above-mentioned studies are mostly extensions of the basic speed-choice models developed 
earlier in the operations research and maritime economics literature.4 Their goals are to choose the 
optimal vessel speeds under various emission regulations to maximize (minimize) shipping companies’ 
profits (costs). Vessel speed is a crucial decision in maritime emission studies for both economic and 
environmental reasons (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2013). It is well established that shipping emissions are 
directly proportional to fuel consumption, which is approximately proportional to the third power of the 
vessel speed (Corbett et al., 2009; Ronen, 2011; Wang and Meng, 2012). When a ship reduces its 
cruising speed, fuel consumption decreases dramatically and so do the emissions. However, slow 
steaming comes with side effects: as the voyage time per trip increases, more ships must be deployed 
to maintain the same throughput or weekly service frequency. Most studies have focused on the 
operational decisions of shipping companies, taking into account the tradeoffs between lower 
speed/emissions versus more ships/capital inputs on specific routes. Few have captured the overall 
                                                              
4 See Psaraftis and Kontovas (2013) for a comprehensive review of various models. 
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effects of these emission regulations because a unilateral regulation imposed within a region may lead 
to asymmetric effects on alternative routes and trigger market competition dynamics. Competing ports 
and shipping companies may act strategically to maximize their own profits, and such actions could 
significantly change the overall effects of unilateral regulations.  
 
Homsombat et al. (2013) compared a unilateral and a coordinated pollution tax policy in a region in 
which competing ports provide differentiated but substitutable services to shipping companies. They 
found that a port that unilaterally imposes a local pollution tax will not only drive shipping business to 
its rival port, but will also suffer increased spill-over pollution.5 Therefore, it is important for regional 
ports and governments to coordinate their pollution control efforts. Although their study provided useful 
managerial and policy insights, it was based on a stylized Hoteling model with strong assumptions, such 
as uniformly distributed shippers along a linear corridor and a linear relationship between pollution 
costs and cargo volume. Such a modeling method restricted the study to inland transportation and thus 
to in-port pollution. In addition, although Homsombat et al. (2013) highlighted the importance of 
explicitly considering the effects of market competition on pollution control, their study focused on port 
policies without modeling shipping operation decisions. As the majority of shipping emissions are 
generated at sea, their model needs to be extended to investigate the broad effects of emission 
regulations.  
 
In this paper, we aim to fill the gap in the literature by investigating the economic and environmental 
effects of unilateral and uniform marine emission regulations in the presence of competition between 
shipping companies and between ports. Unlike most studies that have focused on shipping lines’ 
decisions on specific routes, we explicitly model the demand side: the possible diversion of cargo to 
alternative shipping routes and inter-port competition. We therefore make several contributions to the 
literature on maritime emissions control, which are summarized as follows. First, we explicitly consider 
the strategic behavior of ports and shipping companies, which allows us to control the effects of market 
dynamics when unilateral/uniform emission regulations are imposed. Second, our model considers 
important operational decisions, thus ensuring that the effects of cargo in-transit inventory costs, the 
cubic approximation of the emission-speed relationship, and the tradeoff between slow steaming and 
the high capital costs of increasing the shipping fleet are properly embedded in the proposed model. 
Closed-form solutions are obtained for the case of fixed cargo demand, allowing us to obtain rich 
analytical results from a generalized model. Numerical simulations are carried out for the case of elastic 
demand to validate the robustness of our conclusions. These methodological improvements allow our 
model to better reflect the complexity in the maritime industry and thus allow solid conclusions and 
                                                              
5 Spill-over effect refers to the outcome that if two ports are located close to each other, the pollutants generated at  one port 
may impose negative effects, or inter-port externalities, to the community or stakeholders in the other port.  
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practical policy recommendations to be made. The modeling details are introduced in the following 
section.  
3. The model 
Competition in the maritime industry is no longer at the level of individual ports or shipping companies, 
but rather at the level of logistics chains (Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998; Van de Voorde and 
Vanelslander, 2009). When choosing between ports, shippers consider sets or combinations of “ports 
and shipping companies” rather than an individual port or shipping company. Therefore, following an 
approach similar to that used in Barbot (2009), we consider a market with two ports, each served by a 
shipping company. Previous studies have used extended model specifications when the research 
objectives were focused on port competition, terminal concessions and specialization per se, or other 
issues such as capacity investments or revenue sharing (see, for example Zhang et al., 2010; Luo et al., 
2012; Xiao et al., 2013; Zhuang et al., 2014; Yip et al., 2014). As depicted in Fig. 2, these two ports 
compete for a fixed volume of cargo Q designated for the same catchment area / destination port. 
Port/Route 1 is served by shipping company 1 and Port/Route 2 by shipping company 2. It is assumed 
that the shipping companies do not change the port they serve during the period under investigation.6 
In this sense, ports compete for cargo through the shipping companies. For ease of notation, subscript i 
(i = 1, 2) is introduced to refer to port i, shipping company i or route i because there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between port, shipping company, and route. Their competitors are denoted with a 
subscript j ( 1,2,j j i  ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. An illustrative network 
                                                              
6 As noted by Álvarez-SanJaime et al. (2013) and Lam et al. (2013), the shipping market is increasingly vertically integrated. 
Shipping companies often invest heavily in ports to gain control over port capacity and secure preferred services (e.g., 
dedicated terminals). As a result, there may be significant switching costs for a shipping company to relocate to a different 
port in a region. 
Port 1 
Origin port 
Route 1  
Catchment area/ Destination port 
Route 2 
Port 2 
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The behaviors of the shipping companies and ports are characterized in a two-stage game. In the first 
stage, the two ports set their own service charges iw , respectively. In the second stage, the shipping 
companies compete with each other by choosing their own freight rates and vessel speeds. Both 
shipping companies and ports are profit-maximizing decision-makers. Similar multi-stage game 
modeling frameworks have been widely used in various maritime (aviation) transport economic studies 
examining the vertical relations between seaports (airports) and carriers (see, for example, Zhang and 
Zhang, 2006; Basso and Zhang, 2007; De Borger et al., 2008; Saeed and Larsen, 2010; Yuen and Zhang, 
2011; Bae et al., 2013; Homsombat et al., 2013; Ishii et al., 2013; Song et al., 2016).7  
 
To facilitate the presentation of the essential ideas, without loss of generality the following assumptions 
are made in this paper. 
 
A1 Two emission regulation scenarios are examined and compared: a unilateral regulation imposed in 
a region vis-à-vis a uniform regulation imposed on the whole market. Although emission regulations 
take various forms in practice (e.g., ECAs, ETS or carbon tax), they are modeled as increases in the 
effective average price of fuel as this is how emission regulations affect carriers’ decisions (Brueckner 
and Zhang, 2010; Wang et al., 2015). This study follows this general approach. Therefore, a unilateral 
emission regulation implies asymmetric effective fuel prices on different shipping routes, which 
corresponds to a situation in which the two ports are not regulated by a single government or port 
authority (e.g., Port of Shanghai and Port of Busan). A uniform emission regulation, in contrast, relates 
to the situation where a single government or port authority has jurisdiction over the whole market 
considered (e.g., Port of Shanghai and Port of Ningbo).  
 
 
A2 The generalized shipping cost per unit of cargo (e.g., per ton or per container) consists of the freight 
rate, the in-transit inventory cost at sea, and the congestion cost at the port. Latent variables such as 
reliability, flexibility, safety etc. are not considered (Panagakos et al., 2014). 
 
A3 The congestion cost at port is assumed to be a linear function of the volume-capacity ratio (see, for 
example, similar specifications in De Borger and Van Dender, 2006; Basso and Zhang, 2007; De Borger 
                                                              
7 In addition to service charges, port capacity expansion has been identified as another important strategic decision variable in 
port competition issue. In this study, however, port capacity expansion decisions are not considered because they are less 
relevant in the context of emission regulations, which are the focus of this study. Port authorities are unlikely to initiate a 
lumpy capacity expansion project in response to emission regulations. On the contrary, they tend to use more flexible pricing 
tools. 
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et al., 2008; Wan and Zhang, 2013; Álvarez-SanJaime et al., 2015). In addition, the considered ports 
have the same capacity and marginal cost.  
 
A4 The operating cost per vessel consists of fixed operation costs, variable bunker fuel costs for the 
main engines and port service charges (see Yin et al., 2014). There are other port-related charges and 
fees, which include various fees levied on the vessels and/or cargo for use of the facilities and services 
offered by the port, such as docking, pilotage, towage, and cargo handling (Stopford, 2009). These 
charges are not considered in our model. If these costs can be regarded as constant, then explicitly 
considering such costs will not bring any material change to our model. 
 
3.1. Market equilibrium without emission regulation 
 
According to A2, if a shipper chooses route i (and hence port i and shipping company i, i = 1, 2) to 
transport its cargo, the generalized shipping cost per unit of cargo (e.g., per ton or per container) iC  
consists of the freight rate iP , the in-transit inventory cost at sea, and the congestion cost at the port. 
Let iL  be the average sailing distance of route i and iv  be shipping company i’s vessel speed. The 
transit time it  at sea is defined as the sailing distance divided by the vessel speed, i.e., i i it L v  . 
Following A3, the congestion cost at port i depends on the ratio of cargo volume iQ  at port i and the 
port capacity iK  . It is assumed to be a linear function of the volume-capacity ratio i iQ K  , i.e., 
i iQ K , where   is a constant. More general congestion cost functions could be adopted (e.g., a 
quadratic form), but this would strongly complicate the technical analysis without providing 
significantly different insights for our policy evaluation. In addition, we consider the case in which both 
ports have the same capacity, i.e., 1 2K K K  . The congestion cost at a port is thus simplified as 
iQ  , where K    . Asymmetric port capacities can be easily modeled by changing the 
specification to i iQ  instead. Specification iQ  is kept because our objective is to identify the net 
effects of competition dynamics caused by emission regulations instead of port capacity per se. 
Shipping cost iC  can, therefore, be specified as 
 
,  1,2ii i i
i
LC P Q i
v
     , (1) 
 
where   is the value of transit time (VOT) of shippers, which depends on the commodity to be 
transported and is higher for more expensive cargo (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2014). For instance, it has 
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been estimated that a one-day delay in cargo delivery entails an inventory cost of $5.75/ton for high-
value industrial products with an average price of $30,000/ton and the cost of capital at 7% (Psaraftis 
and Kontovas, 2010). For a vessel with a payload of 8,000 tons, this implies a sizeable in-transit 
inventory cost of $46,000 per day. Ruling out the unlikely case in which one route (and thus the 
associated shipping company and port) receives no traffic volume at all, at equilibrium, we have  
 
1 2
1 2
,
.
C C
Q Q Q
    (2) 
 
Following De Borger et al. (2008), Wan and Zhang (2013) and Ishii et al. (2013), the above equilibrium 
conditions imply that the generalized shipping cost is equal across the two alternative routes and the 
total cargo is distributed between them. Substituting Eq. (1) into Eq. (2) and solving Eq. (2) yields the 
following demand function for shipping company i:8 
 
1 ,  , 1, 2,
2
j i
i j i
j i
L LQ Q P P i j i j
v v
                 
. (3) 
 
In Eq. (3), note that an increase in the freight rate iP  or a decrease in the vessel speed iv  of shipping 
company i will reduce its own cargo volume iQ  and increase its competitor j’s cargo volume jQ .  
 
3.1.1. Shipping company’s profit 
According to A4, the annual operating cost per vessel of shipping company i can be divided into three 
parts. First, a fixed operation cost i , which includes the cost for crews, supplies, insurance, periodic 
maintenance, and fuel consumption for auxiliary engines; i  is assumed to be exogenously given. 
Second, the variable bunker fuel costs for the main engines if , which are assumed to follow the cubic 
rule thus that bunker fuel consumption is proportional to the third power of sailing speed (Corbett et al., 
2009; Psaraftis et al., 2010, 2013, 2014; Wang et al., 2015). The fuel cost is specified as 3i i i i if v    , 
where i  is a coefficient representing a vessel’s energy efficiency, i  is the effective bunker fuel price 
on route i, i  denotes the average working time at sea per year for a vessel. Third, the port service 
                                                              
8 Generally there are two approaches to determine the demand function for shipping companies, i.e. a spatial price equilibrium 
(SPE) model as presented in this paper or a discrete choice model such as multinomial logit (MNL) model. For more 
discussions on applications of the latter model, please refer to Wang et al. (2014) and the references therein. 
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charges per unit of cargo, iw .With the above specifications, shipping company i sets the freight rate iP  
and vessel speed iv  to maximize its own profit 
s
i  (superscript s denotes a shipping company), written 
as 
 
,
max  ( ) ( ) ,  1, 2
i i
s
i i i i i i iP v
P w Q f N i        , (4) 
 
where iN  denotes the number of vessels required to transport iQ  units of cargo.  
 
Let iu  represent a vessel’s capacity. The annual cargo output per vessel is thus i i i i i i iu t u v L    
(Wang et al., 2015). We then have ( )i i i i i iN Q L u v  , reflecting an inverse relation between iN  and 
iv . The explanation is straightforward: a lower vessel speed implies a longer transit time and thus fewer 
deliveries each year, calling for more vessels to be deployed. Hence, the second cost component in Eq. 
(4) (i.e., ( )i i if N  ) captures the tradeoff between the fuel cost saving (decrease in if ) and the capital 
cost increase (increase in iN  ) due to slow steaming. The first-order optimality conditions for the 
shipping company’s profit-maximization problem (4) are 
 
3( ) 0,  1, 2
s
i i i i i i i i
i i i
i i i i i
L v QQ P w i
P u v P
                 
, and (5) 
3
2
( ) 2 0,  1, 2
s
i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
L v Q L LP w Q v Q i
v u v v u u v
                      
. (6) 
 
It can be shown that the Hessian matrix associated with the profit function si  is negative definite (for 
a sketched proof, please see Appendix A). The resultant (unique) equilibrium vessel speed and freight 
rate can thus be solved as follows: 
 
3 ,  1,2
2
i i i
i
i i i
uv i      , and (7) 
2
,  , 1,2,
3 2
i j j j i i
i
j j j i i i
w w L LP Q i j i j
v u v u
                
. (8) 
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The optimal vessel speed in Eq. (7) implies, other things being equal (the values of i , iu , i  and i ), 
that shipping companies will choose the same vessel speed as long as the effective fuel price, which is 
the sum of the bunker fuel price and the fuel tax or cost increase due to regulation, is equal on both 
routes (i.e., 1 2   ). In addition, a higher VOT ( ) or fixed cost ( i ) or a lower effective fuel price 
( i ) will induce a higher vessel speed. For example, a higher fixed operation cost or a lower effective 
fuel price makes slow steaming less desirable because the cost increase associated with a larger iN  will 
outweigh the fuel cost savings (i.e., smaller if ). A higher VOT will prompt shipping companies to 
increase the vessel speed to capture more cargoes from its competitor. Eq. (8) suggests that an increase 
in the port charge of either port will induce a higher freight rate, although a shipping company’s pricing 
decision is more sensitive to the charge set by the port it serves.  
 
Substituting Eq. (8) into Eq. (3) yields the resultant demand for shipping company i: 
 
2 1 1 2
1 23 2 , 3 23 3
w w w wQ Q Q Q                      , (9) 
where 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 1 1 16 6 6 6
L L
v u v u
                 
. The demand along a route depends on the difference 
in port charges ( 1 2w w ). This further confirms the effects of inter-port competition. 
 
3.1.2. Port’s profit 
 
Following De Borger et al. (2008), Homsombat et al. (2013), Wan and Zhang (2013), Song et al. (2016), 
although port-handling operations are usually privately controlled by a few terminal operating 
companies, these companies are aggregated into one monopoly operator per port. Each port sets its 
service charge iw  to maximize its own profit. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the two ports 
have the same constant marginal cost c. Its objective function pi  (superscript p denotes a port) can be 
specified as 
 
max  ( ) ,  1, 2
i
p
i i iw
w c Q i     . (10) 
 
Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (10) and solving for the corresponding first-order optimality conditions, 
we have the following optimal port service charges: 
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1
2
3 3 ,
3 3 .
w Q c
w Q c
           (11) 
 
For ease of understanding, the interrelationships among the three stakeholders (ports, shipping 
companies, and shippers) are summarized in Fig. 3. It can be seen in Fig. 3 that the input of a stakeholder 
is the outputs of the other stakeholders, and vice versa. Note that so far we have derived the solutions 
without assuming i  , iu  , i  , and i  to be the same across the two shipping companies. In the 
following section, however, we let these parameters be the same. Such an approach is used to isolate 
the combined effects of these parameters so that the net effects of competition in the presence of 
imposed emission regulations can be clearly identified. For the convenience of readers, Table 1 
summarizes the equilibrium solutions associated with ports and shipping companies (for tables please 
refer to Appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. A diagrammatical representation of the model 
 
3.2. Effects of emission regulations on shipping company and port competition 
When the EU proposed to include the aviation industry in the EU-ETS, a major concern was whether 
airline competition would be significantly affected (Albers et al., 2009; Scheelhaase et al., 2010). In the 
following analysis, we check whether a similar problem arises in the maritime industry. First, we 
consider Scenario 1, in which a unilateral regulation on marine emissions is implemented in a region. 
Ports 
  Objective: maximizing their own profit (Eq. (10)) 
  Input: port's demand  (Eq. (9)) 
 Output: optimal service charge  (Eq. (11)) 
Shipping companies 
 Objective: maximizing their own profit (Eq. (4)) 
 Input: shipping company's demand  (Eq. (3)) and ports' service charge  (Eq. (11)) 
 Output: optimal freight rate  (Eq. (8)), vessel speed  (Eq. (7)) and port's demand  (Eq. (9)) 
Shippers 
 Objective: minimizing their own generalized shipping cost (Eq. (1)) 
  Input: shipping companies' decision variables  (Eq. (8)) and  (Eq. (7)) 
  Output: shipping company's demand function  (Eq. (3)) 
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Without loss of generality, we assume that part of route 1 is subject to emission regulations whereas 
route 2 is not. The effective fuel prices along the two routes are thus asymmetric/differentiated, i.e., 
1 2   . From Table 1, the following comparative statics results can be derived (the detailed proof is 
omitted to save space, but is available from the authors on request):  
 
1
1
0v  , 
2
1
0v  , (12) 
1
1
0P   if 
5
u
   ; Otherwise, 
1
1
0P  , 
2
1
0P  , (13) 
1
1
0w  , 
2
1
0w  , 
1
1
0Q  , 
2
1
0Q  , and (14) 
1
1
0
s  , 
2
1
0
s  , 
1
1
0
p  , 
2
1
0
p  .  (15) 
 
When the effective fuel price 1  on route 1 increases due to the emission regulation, shipping company 
1 will lower its optimal vessel speed (i.e., 1 1 0v   ), leading to increased transit time. It thus has 
an incentive to lower its freight rate to compensate for the increased transit time. However, it will also 
want to increase its freight rate to offset the increased fuel cost. Therefore, shipping company 1 can 
either increase or decrease its freight rate 1P . If the value of transit time is large ( 5 u     in this 
study), the former incentive dominates the latter, leading to a decrease in the freight rate 1P  (when 
1 1 0P   ), and thus the reverse conclusion holds. As port 1 serves the same amount of cargo that 
shipping company 1 captures, port 1 will decrease its service charge ( 1 1 0w    ) to subsidize 
shipping company 1 in competition with port 2. Shipping company 2’s optimal vessel speed 
( 2 1 0v   ) will not change, so it will increase its freight rate 2P  ( 2 1 0P   ) to take advantage 
of the increased shipping cost on route 1. For the same reason, port 2 increases its service charge 
( 2 1 0w   ). Finally, a higher effective fuel price on route 1 will divert some cargoes from route/port 
1 to route/port 2 ( 1 1 0Q    , 2 1 0Q    ). The profit of shipping companies on route 1 will 
decrease whereas the profit of shipping companies on route 2 will increase. Clearly, a unilateral 
emission regulation will put the affected shipping companies and ports at a disadvantage. 
 
We now look at Scenario 2, in which a uniform emission regulation is implemented over the whole 
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market. This leads to an identical increase in the effective fuel price on both routes, i.e., 1 2= =   . The 
following results (i.e., Eqs. (16)-(19)) can be derived when route 2 is a longer route, i.e., 1 2L L . For 
the case of route 1 being a longer route, i.e., 1 2L L , the results can be easily obtained by interchanging 
the route indicators in these expressions (i.e., the subscripts). The detailed proof of Eqs. (16)-(19) is 
omitted here, but is available from the authors on request. 
 
1 0P  ,  (16) 
2 0P   if 
5
u
    and 
2
1
4 4
5
L u
L u
      ; Otherwise, 
2 0P  ,  (17) 
1 0w  , 
2 0w  , 
1 0Q  , 
2 0Q  , and  (18) 
1 0
s  , 
2 0
s  , 
1 0
p  , 
2 0
p  .  (19) 
 
Inequality 1 0P    implies that an identical increase in the effective fuel price always raises the 
freight rate on the shorter route (i.e., route 1). Although 2 0P   is possible in theory, it seems 
unlikely in reality because it requires 2L  to be at least four times longer than 1L  . Therefore, it is 
plausible that a uniform emission regulation could lead to an increase in the freight rates on both routes. 
Other comparative statics results show that a uniform emission regulation discourages shipping 
companies and ports from serving the longer routes. Some cargoes will be diverted to the shorter route 
1, and both shipping company 2 and port 2 will suffer a profit loss. This is consistent with the simulation 
results in Lee et al. (2013), which showed that the effects on the cargo volume are likely to be 
asymmetric even under a uniform carbon tax implemented globally. The routes with longer distances 
would lose some cargo volume to the routes with shorter distances. These results are summarized in the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. A unilateral emission regulation harms the affected ports and shipping companies in 
terms of lower cargo volume and profits, and benefits the ports and shipping companies not subject to 
such regulation. Similarly, a uniform emission regulation favors those ports and shipping companies 
with a shorter sailing distance at the expense of the ports and shipping companies on longer routes. 
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3.3. Effects of emission regulations on total emissions 
 
It is important to fully assess and compare the effectiveness of different emission regulations before 
implementation (CE Delft, 2009; Kim et al., 2013). This section devotes to comparing the effectiveness 
of unilateral and uniform regulations in reducing the total fuel consumption/emissions. It should be 
mentioned that emission amount is directly proportional to fuel consumption. The total fuel 
consumption is the sum of the fuel consumption of all shipping companies, given by 
 2 21 1 1 2 2 2sF L Q v L Q vu  . In Scenario 1, in which the effective fuel price 1  goes up, both 1Q  and 
1v  go down and thus the fuel consumption of shipping company 1 decreases. Meanwhile, 2Q  increases 
but 2v  remains unchanged, leading to an increase in the fuel consumption of shipping company 2. To 
identify the net effect of fuel price on the total fuel consumption, we can calculate 
 
 3 21 1 1 12
1 1 1 1 12
s s v vF F Av Bv C
v uv
           , (20) 
 
where 1 2
1
2
22 0
6 6
L LA L Q
v u
        
, 2
1 06 6
B L
u
      
, and 2
1 2 2 06 6
C L L v
u
      
. It can 
be proved that 1 0
sF     if 31 ( ) 2u v         and 1 0sF     if 
3
1 ( ) 2u v         (the detailed proof is given in Appendix B), where   denotes the lower 
bound of the bunker fuel price (i.e., the lowest possible bunker fuel price) and v  is the sole positive 
real root of the equation 3 21 1 1( ) 0f v Av Bv C    . Therefore, there exists a threshold of effective 
fuel price, beyond which unilateral regulation can actually increase the total emissions. Hence, 
unilateral regulation will produce a counterproductive outcome. 
 
In Scenario 2, with a uniform emission regulation, 1 2= =     holds; we thus have 1 2v v v   
according to Table 1. The total fuel consumption can be simplified as 
 
2 2
1 2 2 1( ) ( )2 6 6
sF L L Qv L L v
u u
              
. (21) 
 
Eq. (21) shows that sF  is a quadratic function of v , whose graph is a parabola opening-upwards with 
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2
2 1
1 2
( ) ( )
12( )
L L uv
L L u Q
        as the axis of symmetry. As 1Q  and 2Q  (shown in Table 1) are positive, we 
must have 2 1
( )( )
6
L L uv v
u Q
      . It can be shown that 0
sF
v
   holds. Given 0
v   (see 
Table 1), we have = 0
s sF F v
v
      , so that total fuel consumption always decreases in the effective 
fuel price. Combining the findings in both scenarios, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. A uniform regulation imposed over the whole market always reduces total emissions. In 
contrast, a unilateral regulation reduces total emisisons when the effective fuel price is not too large, 
and increases total emissions if the effective fuel price is larger than a threshold.  
 
In the past decades, little progress has been made in devising a uniform maritime emission regulation 
that can be accepted on a global/multi-lateral basis. Some regulators have decided to move forward with 
unilateral regulations. Our analytical results caution policy-makers against such practices. On the one 
hand, the international society has to start from somewhere to attack the global warming problem and 
control maritime emissions. On the other hand, unilateral regulation carries a risk of backfiring as it 
may increase rather than reduce global emissions. Therefore, it is important to consider market 
dynamics and to evaluate the effects of unilateral/regional regulation on a case-by-case basis.  
 
It should be mentioned that Proposition 2 is derived when shipping companies and ports make decisions 
separately. As noted by Álvarez-SanJaime et al. (2013) and Lam et al. (2013), vertical integration is an 
increasingly prominent feature in the shipping market. It can be shown that the result in Proposition 2 
still holds if shipping companies and ports are vertically integrated. The proof is provided in Appendix 
C. 
4. Numerical study 
In the previous sections, the closed-form solutions and solution properties of the proposed model have 
been obtained under the assumption that demand is fixed, i.e., 1 2Q Q Q  . To validate the robustness 
of these conclusions, in this section we consider a (linear) elastic demand function case. As not all of 
the analytical solutions can be derived under the elastic demand case, a numerical simulation is carried 
out instead. In the following, we first set the parameter values for a base case, then carry out extensive 
sensitive tests to validate the robustness of the simulation results. 
 
Following Wang et al. (2015), we consider the most widely used containership type, the Post Panamax, 
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with an approximated capacity u  of 6,000 TEUs. For containerships with a capacity of 6000-7000 
TEUs, the bunker fuel consumption is estimated to be 203.4 tons per day when sailing at a design speed 
of 25 knots (Notteboom and Cariou, 2009). The corresponding calculated hourly engine efficiency is 
3 4203.4 25 / 24 5.42 10       . The average voyage distance is 9,036 nm according to the 
international seaborne traffic data published in 2007 in the Review of Maritime Transport (UNCTAD, 
2008). Without loss of generality, 1L  and 2L  are assumed to be 9,000 nm and 9,500 nm, respectively. 
According to the Second IMO GHG Study (2009), the average working time at sea for a ship is 270 
days per year, equivalent to =6480  hours. The daily fixed operating cost varies from $8,150 for a 
Panamax vessel of 4,000 TEUs to $11,575 for a Mega-Post-Panamax vessel of 10,000 TEUs 
(Notteboom, 2006). In this study, the daily fixed operating cost for the 6,000 TEU Post Panamax is 
assumed to be $10,000, which amounts to an annual fixed operating cost of  = $2.7 million. Using the 
performance statistics from the Port of Prince Rupert in 2011, the average cargo value is set as 
$10,957/TEU.9 This implies an in-transit inventory cost of  = $0.87/h/TEU for a capital cost of 7%. 
Cariou and Cheaitou (2012) used a weekly cargo demand of about 7200 TEUs, resulting in an annual 
demand of 0.375 million TEUs. Assuming a 20% potential demand growth rate, the potential annual 
demand is 0.45Q   million TEUs. The bunker fuel price 2  on route 2 for the base case is set as 
$300/ton, a representative average price in 2007 (Notteboom and Vernimmen, 2009). Table 2 
summarizes the parameter values used in the numerical simulation. 
 
For the fixed demand case (i.e., 1 2Q Q Q   ), we have proved that there exists a threshold of the 
effective fuel price, beyond which total emissions will increase in the effective fuel price. To verify the 
robustness of this result under variable demand, a linear elastic demand function is specified as 
1 2 -Q Q Q bCost  , in which the coefficient b is assumed to vary from 0 to 50. It is noteworthy that 
when b = 0, the linear demand function reduces to the fixed demand case investigated earlier. The 
effects of a unilateral regulation and the coefficient b on the total emissions are depicted in Fig. 4, in 
which the unilateral emission regulation is modeled by changing the effective bunker fuel price 1  on 
route 1 from $300/ton to $1200/ton. A higher effective fuel price corresponds to a stricter emission 
regulation, and vice versa. The price range reflects the fluctuation of the bunker price (Notteboom and 
Vernimmen, 2009; Wang and Meng, 2012). Fig. 4 follows a U-shaped surface. For all values of b 
considered, there always exists a threshold beyond which a stricter unilateral regulation (i.e., a higher 
effective fuel price on route 1) leads to more total emissions. For the fixed demand case with b = 0, the 
simulated threshold fuel price is about $694/ton, which can be analytically verified using Eq. (20). 
                                                              
9 http://www.rupertport.com/documents/value-of-trade-2012/pdf. 
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Fig. 4. Effects of unilateral regulation on total fuel consumption with different values of b 
 
For further clarification, Fig. 5 depicts the contour in the space of the effective fuel price 1  and the 
coefficient b. The dashed blue curve in Fig. 5 represents the best response of the threshold fuel price 
1  to the coefficient b. To prevent a counterproductive outcome, the effective fuel price with regulation 
effects considered should be kept below the dashed curve. In contrast to unilateral regulations, a uniform 
regulation is modeled by equating 1  and 2 , which vary simultaneously from $300/ton to $1200/ton 
in the numerical simulation. Different from Fig. 4, the total emissions always decrease in the effective 
fuel price for any value of b, as shown in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 5. Change in the threshold fuel price with b 
 
 
 
 Fig. 6. Effects of uniform regulation on total fuel consumption with different values of b 
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5. Conclusion and further studies 
With growing trade volumes, marine shipping has become a major source of carbon emissions.  Various 
regulations have been proposed in the maritime industry for the control of emissions, ranging from 
mandatory operational requirements to industry standards and market-based instruments. Against this 
background, many technical reports and studies were devoted to discussing the design issues or the 
legal implications of various uniform or unilateral emission regulations (see CE Delft, 2009; IMO, 
2010a; Kremlis, 2010; Ringbom, 2011; Koesler et al., 2015), with a few addressing their associated 
macroeconomic effects (Lee et al., 2013; Hermeling et al., 2015). There is another stream of studies in 
the literature investigating how the introduction of certain emission regulations on specific routes affects 
the operational strategies of shipping companies, especially the trade-off between slow steaming and 
increased fleet size (see, among others, Corbett et al., 2009; Cariou and Cheaitou, 2012; Chang and 
Wang, 2012; Doundnikoff and Lacoste, 2014; Fagerholt and Psaraftis, 2015). Although the previous 
related studies have offered rich insights into the effects of emission regulation on shipping companies’ 
operations, they have rarely considered the competition between regional ports and shipping companies, 
and the responses of the shipping companies and port authorities to unilateral/uniform regulations 
(Homsombat et al., 2013; Sys et al., 2016). The overall effects of such regulations on the maritime 
industry therefore remain unclear. 
 
In this study, a two-stage game model is proposed to investigate the effects of alternative emission 
regulation regimes taking into account market dynamics. The main contributions of this paper are 
summarized as follows.  
 
1. This paper supplements extant maritime emission studies by explicitly modeling ports' strategic 
behaviors when evaluating the emission regulations. Although the previous related studies have 
offered rich insights into the effects of emission regulations on shipping company’s operations, they 
rarely considered the competition of regional ports and shipping companies due to the 
implementation of unilateral or uniform emission regulations. The comparative statics results 
derived in Section 3.2 indicate that port charges would be affected (e.g., port may subsidize towards 
its shipping company) under either unilateral or uniform emission regulations. This finding 
confirms the importance to explicitly consider ports' behavior in relevant studies. Therefore, 
governments have to take ports' response into consideration when evaluating the effects of any 
proposed emission regulation; otherwise, biased results would be obtained.  
 
2. The proposed model incorporates demand-side responses as well as shipping companies' 
operational decisions, thus that the effects of cargo in-transit inventory cost, the cubic 
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approximation of the emission-speed relationship, and the tradeoff between slow steaming and high 
capital costs of ship fleet are properly embedded into the proposed model. Closed-form solutions 
have been obtained for the case of fixed cargo demand, allowing us to obtain rich analytical results 
from a generalized model. Therefore, this paper manages to strike a balance between relevant 
theoretical economic analysis and operational studies.  
 
3. This paper finds that there exists a threshold of effective fuel price, beyond which the unilateral 
regulation can actually increase the total emission. In order to prevent a counterproductive outcome, 
the effective fuel price with regulation effects considered should be kept below the threshold, e.g., 
the dashed curve of the contour figure as depicted in the numerical study. When relevant data are 
readily available, the proposed model and analytical techniques can be applied to a real case, such 
as the case between Port of Shanghai and Port of Busan, where the former is recently subject to 
ECAs while the latter not yet.  
 
4. Under either type of regulation there can be asymmetric effects on shipping companies and ports. 
A unilateral emission regulation harms the affected ports and shipping companies in terms of lower 
cargo volume and profits, and benefits the ports and shipping companies not subject to such 
regulation. A uniform emission regulation favors those ports and shipping companies with shorter 
sailing distance at the expenses of the ports and shipping companies on the longer routes. Therefore, 
regulators and the maritime industry need to strike a balance between emission reduction and fair 
competition. 
 
Although our study extends previous operational models by capturing market dynamics, it can be 
further extended in several directions. First, although the numerical study uses realistic parameter values 
wherever possible, it illustrates the model application with two hypothetical competing routes. It would 
be useful to investigate specific markets, such as the shipping routes to the Port of Shanghai and Port 
of Busan. Because the Port of Shanghai was included in the newly proposed ECA, it would be 
meaningful to analyze how market outcomes would evolve in response to the imposed policy. When 
industry data can be collected in the future, such an empirical study will provide useful managerial 
insights and policy recommendations complementary to our study. Second, in the medium to long term, 
shipping companies can improve their vessels’ energy efficiency by upgrading their fleets (either by 
purchasing new ships or adopting innovative technologies) in response to increasingly strict maritime 
emission regulations. In contrast to the static model proposed in this study, a dynamic multi-period 
model incorporating such a decision variable is worth exploring (Balland et al., 2012, 2015). Third, this 
study considers emission regulations in a general way by increasing the average effective price of fuel. 
In practice, however, there may exist other forms of maritime regulation such as restricting per-trip 
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emissions (similar to EEDI standards) or simply setting a total emission allowance. It would be 
interesting to investigate the differential effects of these specific measures. Finally, this study only 
considers cargo diversion between different shipping routes under unilateral emission regulation. 
However, there may be a shift to land-based transport modes such as railway or trucks (Holmgren et al., 
2014). For instance, cargo moving between the Far East and Europe can be transported either via ocean 
route or the trans-Siberian railway (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2010). Therefore, it would be meaningful 
to extend the proposed model to consider the competition among different transport modes in a further 
study. 
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Appendix A. Definiteness of the associated Hessian Matrix 
The Hessian matrix H associated with the shipping company's profit is as follow. 
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Consequently, the Hessian matrix H is negative definite, and thus the shipping company's profit function 
is concave and the profit maximization problem has a unique optimal solution. 
 
Appendix B. Proof of sign of 1sF   in Eq. (20) 
To determine the sign of the function 3 21 1 1( )f v Av Bv C   , we first investigate its monotonicity. 
From the first-order optimality condition, we have 21 1 1( ) 3 2 0f v Av Bv     , thus leading to two 
positive solutions, i.e., 1 0v   and 1 2 3v B A . It is easy to show that 1( ) 0f v   if 10 2 3v B A   
and 1( ) 0f v   if 1 0v   or 1 2 3v B A . Fig. 7 depicts the rough shape of function f. 
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Fig. 7. The rough shape of function 1( )f v  
As (0) 0f C     and 1( )f v    when 1v   , the continuous function f must cross the 
horizontal axis only once (e.g., at v  ). Therefore, 1( ) 0f v   if 10 v v    and 1( ) 0f v   if 1v v   . 
With the relation between 1  and 1v  expressed in Eq. (7), the threshold effective fuel price can be 
calculated as * 31 = ( ) 2u v       . Hence, 1 0sF     if *1 1    , and 1 0sF     if 
*
1 1     . 
 
Appendix C. Solutions for vertical integration 
When ports and shipping companies are vertically integrated, the objective function is to maximize their 
joint profit p si i i     , formulated as 
,
max  ( ) ( ) ,  1, 2
i i
i i i i i iP v
P c Q f N i        . 
 
The port service charges ( iw ) disappear since they are internalized from the from the supply chain 
profit's perspective, i.e., the upstream port's revenue and its downstream shipping company's cost are 
offset (Song et al., 2016). The optimal solutions of the joint profit maximization problem are shown in 
Table 3. Similar to the procedure described in Appendix B, it can be shown that Proposition 2 also holds 
for the vertical integration scenario. 
 
Table 1 Solutions for the two-stage game. 
Stage one: Ports 
0 2B/3A 
-C 
v1 
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Decision variables 1 3 3w Q c     , 2 3 3w Q c      
Cargo volume 1
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Stage two: Shipping companies 
Decision variables 
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Table 2 Input data for numerical illustration. 
Parameter Description Value 
  Annual working time at sea 6,480 hours 
u  Vessel capacity 6,000 TEUs 
  Annual fixed operating cost $2.7 million 
  Hourly engine efficiency 45.42 10  
  Value of time $0.87/h/TEU 
  Port congestion cost $10-4/TEU 
1L , 2L  Sailing distance 9,000 nm and 9,500 nm 
2  Fuel price on route 2 $300/ton 
c  Marginal cost at port $180/TEU 
Q  Potential annual demand 0.45 million TEUs 
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Table 3 Solutions under the vertical integration between port and shipping companies. 
Decision variables 
3 ,  1, 2
2i i
uv i       
2 ,  , 1,2,
2 2
j ji
i
i j j
L LLP Q c i j i j
u v v v
              
 
Cargo volume 1
1 ( )
2
Q Q    , 2
1 ( )
2
Q Q     
Joint profit 21
1 ( )
2
s Q     , 
2
2
1 ( )
2
s Q      
where 2 1
2 1
3 =
2 2
L L
u v v
           
. 
  
